Ron Rivest (the "R" in RSA) actually invented a method that is not all that complex, that allows us to use paper ballots, and have reasonable certainty that no fraud has occurred in counting them, yet not be able to prove to a third party (as in, another person) how we voted.
It can be easily applied to Range Voting, and even to plurality voting with a little work, but NOT to IRV.
See: http://rangevoting.org/Rivest3B.html
In a nutshell, suppose the range of your Range Voting ballot is from -5 to +5. You get three ballots, and the sum of your scores for any one candidate is your score for that candidate (so obviously the scores can't sum to be higher than 5 or lower than -5, and a dumb machine verfies that). Then you get a certified copy of ONE of those ballots, and drop your ballots into a bin. Later, the results of EVERY ballot are publicly posted. You check that your ballot (the one you got to keep) matches what is publicly posted. Just having 1/3 of your full ballot means you can't prove how you voted, so you can't sell your vote. But if fraudsters try to cheat the system, and edit a ballot, there's a 1/3 chance they edit a ballot-third that someone took home a copy of, meaning they get caught. If they alter TWO ballots, there's a 5/9 chance the fraud is detectable. After a certain point, say 10 ballots, the odds of fraud being detectable, and with PROOF in hand (Hello, Mr. Dan Rather? I have a ballot here which doesn't match the publicly posted result) approach the mid 90's. Go up to a more significant number, and forget it. Fraudsters can't get away with it.
This is what people who are obsessed with voting methods cook up for fun.
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timeasmymeasure
Re: Supermajority vote?
Date: 2007-01-23 04:58 am (UTC)It can be easily applied to Range Voting, and even to plurality voting with a little work, but NOT to IRV.
See: http://rangevoting.org/Rivest3B.html
In a nutshell, suppose the range of your Range Voting ballot is from -5 to +5. You get three ballots, and the sum of your scores for any one candidate is your score for that candidate (so obviously the scores can't sum to be higher than 5 or lower than -5, and a dumb machine verfies that). Then you get a certified copy of ONE of those ballots, and drop your ballots into a bin. Later, the results of EVERY ballot are publicly posted. You check that your ballot (the one you got to keep) matches what is publicly posted. Just having 1/3 of your full ballot means you can't prove how you voted, so you can't sell your vote. But if fraudsters try to cheat the system, and edit a ballot, there's a 1/3 chance they edit a ballot-third that someone took home a copy of, meaning they get caught. If they alter TWO ballots, there's a 5/9 chance the fraud is detectable. After a certain point, say 10 ballots, the odds of fraud being detectable, and with PROOF in hand (Hello, Mr. Dan Rather? I have a ballot here which doesn't match the publicly posted result) approach the mid 90's. Go up to a more significant number, and forget it. Fraudsters can't get away with it.
This is what people who are obsessed with voting methods cook up for fun.
CLAY