Range Voting

[kevin_standlee]

The folks advocating Range Voting contacted WSFS (actually, the WSFS webmaster, sfrose) lobbying WSFS to change its voting system from the Instant Runoff Voting system we currently use for site selection and the Hugo Awards. Sharon told them how our rules work and suggested that if they want to change them, they come to WSFS business meetings and propose and debate the changes there, like all other rule changes. The advocate's response, in my opinion, amounted to, "Our proposal is so obviously Right that we shouldn't have to do all that hard, expensive work. You should change your rules because we tell you to do so."

I often tell people who come to me with rules-change proposals, "If you think it's worthwhile, come and submit it yourself. I'll help you with all of the technicalities to the best of my ability, but you have to make your own case, lobby people yourself, and get the votes by convincing people." Most of the time, this discourages them -- democracy is hard work! But sometimes we get people who are willing to work and debate, and sometimes we even get workable changes and improvements.

WSFS rules are intentionally designed to be resistant to change; however, they can be changed if people work hard enough at it. But it's not enough to just lobby a Board of Directors or subvert the Chairman; you have to convince the members.

Comments

[boywhocantsayno.livejournal.com]

In what respect? You mean to say that the material is too complicated? Too boring? What exactly is your complaint?

Poorly presented, perhaps. Upon a second reading, it looks like a fairly simple system, but you're making it sound much more complex than it needs to be.

I still have a major problem with it: the points you award to a given candidate can be all over the map. A voter who votes "candidate A=9, B=5, C=1" has more weight given to his vote than a voter who opts for "A=3, B=2, C=1" when they've ranked the candidates in the exact same order. This may be a good way of rating a book or a movie for the purpose of telling someone how much you enjoyed it, but it's not good for choosing a convention site or giving out awards when you're comparing two or more candidates directly against each other.

This isn't Olympic figure skating, where every candidate starts out with a score of 6.0 and points are deducted for turning a triple Axel into a double.

Oh, and I also take issue with your example of bees. Simply screaming the loudest is no way to make a democratic decision.

[thebrokenladder.livejournal.com]

Poorly presented, perhaps. Upon a second reading, it looks like a fairly simple system, but you're making it sound much more complex than it needs to be.

I presented it as "Score all the candidates and elect the one who has the highest average." How does that make it sound complicated?

It is important to differentiate between the complexity of the actual voting method, and the complexity of understanding why the voting method is good. In other words, explaining to people what monotonicity and independence of irrelevant alternatives are. Explaining social utility efficiency...that can be frustrating and difficult. But that has nothing to do with how complicated the voting method itself is. When people say that Range Voting would fail under strategic voting, I have to pull out social utility efficiency calculations to prove to them, "No, you're wrong, it wouldn't" and "stop expecting your intuition to have any place in such a deeply mathematical discussion".

A voter who votes "candidate A=9, B=5, C=1" has more weight given to his vote than a voter who opts for "A=3, B=2, C=1" when they've ranked the candidates in the exact same order.

This is a benefit of Range Voting. Say a third voter came in and scored A=0, B=6. B would be the logical winner, even though A is the first choice of two voters. That is, a switch from B to A would only affect voter 2 a tiny amount, and take voter 1 from being moderately happy to being very happy. But voter 3 would go from relative happiness to misery. I don't think that's a good situation. But if voters don't agree, they are free to maximize their scores. In fact, I suggest they do - because what meaning do any scores have if you do not first give your least and most favorite a minimum and maximum score respectively? Without a frame of reference, what do the numbers even mean?

So, in short, don't blame the voting system when voters do silly things. This reminds me of the 97,488 Floridians who voted for Nader in 2000, only to help secure the victory for Bush. Should we have taken Nader off the ballot, to protect them from their own silliness?

This may be a good way of rating a book or a movie for the purpose of telling someone how much you enjoyed it, but it's not good for choosing a convention site or giving out awards when you're comparing two or more candidates directly against each other.

On the contrary, it's the best of the common single-winner voting methods, based on extensive calculations of social utility efficiency (http://RangeVoting.org/vsr.html). That is, by using Range Voting, you will be greatly more satsified with election results than you would be with IRV. The effect is almost as large as the one caused by going from random selection, to IRV elections like you have now.

This isn't Olympic figure skating, where every candidate starts out with a score of 6.0 and points are deducted for turning a triple Axel into a double.

I don't recall ever saying that it was. It has been compared more to gymnastics scoring, but even then that's just to give people the concept in a simple recognizable scenario. Maybe "like rating books on Amazon" would be better for certain audiences.

[thebrokenladder.livejournal.com]

34% McCain > Gore > Edwards
17% Gore > McCain > Edwards
15% Gore > Edwards > McCain
34% Edwards > Gore > McCain

McCain wins with IRV, even though 66% of voters prefer Gore to both McCain and Edwards. IRV picks the wrong winner. Any election method can exhibit this kind of phenomenon, but with IRV, it's negative impact on social utility is significantly worse.